The Effects of Total Sleep Deprivation on Bayesian Updating by David L. Dickinson & Sean P.A. Drummond
The Effects of Total Sleep Deprivation on Bayesian Updating* 
 
David L. Dickinson 
Dept. of Economics 
Appalachian State University 
Sean P.A. Drummond 
Dept. of Psychiatry 
Laboratory for Sleep and Behavioral Neuroscience 
University of California—San Diego 
Psychology Service 
Veterans Affairs San Diego Healthcare System 
 
ABSTRACT 
Recent evidence suggests that nearly 25% of U.S. adults (47 million) suffer from 
some level of sleep deprivation.  The impact of this sleep deprivation on the U.S. 
economy includes direct medical expenses related to sleep deprivation and related 
disorders, the cost of accidents, and the cost of reduced worker productivity.  Sleep 
research has examined the effects of sleep deprivation on a number of performance 
measures, but the effects of sleep deprivation on decision-making under uncertainty are 
largely unknown.  In this article, subjects perform a decision task (Grether, 1980) in both 
a well-rested and experimentally sleep-deprived state.  The experimental task allows us to 
explore the extent to which subjects weight prior odds versus new evidence (i.e., 
information) when forming subjective (posterior) beliefs of a particular event.  Well-
rested subjects display a tendency to overweight the evidence in forming subjective 
posterior probability estimates, which is inconsistent with Bayes rule but possibly 
consistent with use of a ‘representativeness’ heuristic.  In his original Bayes rule 
experiment, Grether (1980) also found that typical student-subjects overweighted the 
evidence relative to the prior odds in making posterior assessments.  Ironically, behavior 
following sleep-deprivation is more consistent with the use of Bayes rule, because this 
treatment significantly reduces the (over)weight that subjects place on the new evidence.  
Because choice accuracy is not significantly affected by sleep deprivation, the significant 
difference in estimated decision-model parameters may indicate that the brain 
compensates under adversity in certain risky choice decision environments.         
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  A large volume of evidence suggests that individuals in industrialized nations are 
becoming increasingly sleep-deprived.  According to a recent poll conducted by the 
National Sleep Foundation, the average American adult slept less than 7 hours per night 
in 2005.  The nightly average was 7.5 hours in 1975 and 9 hours per night in 1910.  This 
trend towards less and less sleep has significant implications given the known effects of 
sleep deprivation:  decreased motor and cognitive performance, reduced vigilance and 
reaction time, worsened mood, and reduced ability to think flexibly (Pilcher and Huffcutt, 
1996; Harrison and Horne, 1999; Harrison and Horne, 2000).  Indeed, even 7 hours of 
sleep per night leads to significantly diminished cognitive performance relative to 8 or 9 
hours (Van Dongen, et al, 2003; Belenky, et al., 2003).  Nearly 50 million Americans, 
close to 25% of all adults, are estimated to suffer from some level of sleep deprivation.  
Sixty percent of adults surveyed reported driving while drowsy, while 37% reported 
falling asleep or nodding off at some point while driving.
1  Estimates of the cost of lost 
U.S. worker productivity caused by sleep deprivation vary, but a conservative estimate—
based on a 4% reduction in productivity for sleep-deprived working adults—is over $40 
billion dollars annually (Stoller, 1997).  
Many professions that give rise to more significant sleep deprivation as a matter 
of routine—emergency personnel, medical residents, military personnel, long-haul truck 
drivers—are also those where impaired functioning can put lives at risk.  A study of long-
haul truck drivers (Mitler, et al. 1997) in Canada and the U.S. found that they averaged 
only about 5 hours of sleep per night.  A recent study of first- and second-year medical 
residency students found that two-thirds reported sleeping an average of six or less hours 
per night (Baldwin, et al. 2004).  A smaller fraction (20%) averaged five hours of sleep a 
                                                 
1 This data is reported by the National Sleep Foundation, and can be accessed at www.sleepfoundation.org.    2
night, and such residents were more likely to report, among other things, having made 
significant medical errors.  Weinger and Ancoli-Israel (2002) concluded that sleep 
deprivation significantly impairs doctors’ performance, thereby impacting patient safety, 
in part due to poor decisions made by sleep deprived physicians.  Also, sleep deprivation 
has been considered at least partially responsible for several major historical disasters, 
including the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the 
Chernobyl Nuclear plant explosion (Coren, 1996).  In sum, the impact of sleep 
deprivation on society as a whole, while difficult to measure precisely, is massive. 
  This paper reports results from a laboratory study that examines the information 
processing abilities of subjects in a well-rested versus an experimentally sleep-deprived 
state.  Much of the existing sleep deprivation research examines subject performance on 
sustained attention, mathematical and/or verbal tasks, such as simple reaction time tasks, 
arithmetic processing, grammatical reasoning, or verbal learning.  Examinations of 
flexible thinking, strategy updating, and risk assessment are relatively new to sleep 
research (see references in Harrison and Horne, 2000).  There is some evidence that 
complex or interesting tasks may be less likely to show deficits under TSD (e.g., Horne, 
1988), but this remains a controversial proposition (Harrison and Horne, 1999; Pilcher 
and Huffcutt, 1992; Wimmer, et al, 1992).    
Our present focus on Bayesian updating as a particular decision model is meant to 
examine the fundamentals of how information is processed by decision-makers.  We 
examine differences in subjects’ propensity to incorporate new information as they 
update prior probabilities to form posterior (subjective) probability estimates.  A Bayes 
rule experiment is administered to subjects both well-rested and after 22-24 hours of total   3
sleep deprivation (TSD).  For comparison to existing economics research, we utilize the 
Bayes rule experiment presented in Grether (1980).  His results indicate that subjects tend 
to overweight new evidence relative to prior odds when forming subjective beliefs.  The 
result, further confirmed in Grether (1992), is largely due to subjects’ tendencies to 
utilize a ‘representativeness’ heuristic in cases where new sample information looks 
representative of one population versus another (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 
1972).
2   
The results from our pooled sample (well-rested and sleep-deprived data) are 
quite similar to those in Grether (1980)—subjects tend to weight new evidence more 
heavily than the prior odds, which is inconsistent with the Bayes rule prediction.  This 
consistency is largely due to the well-rested subsample.  Results from the TSD subsample 
reveal that subjects do not overweight the evidence relative to the prior odds of event 
occurrence.  In fact, TSD subjects place less weight on both prior odds and evidence (and 
roughly equal weight on each), relative to when well-rested, in forming subjective 
posterior estimates.  This change is not statistically significant, though, for the prior odds 
variable.  Interestingly, the significant reduction in the decision weight placed on new 
evidence following TSD does not necessarily result in less accurate probability estimates.  
There is, however, some evidence that decision model error terms have higher variance in 
the TSD subsample, which implies somewhat less consistent behavior under TSD.  
Because information updating is a fundamental component of decision making, this 
unique examination of Bayesian updating following sleep deprivation is relevant to a 
large variety of behavioral applications.  
                                                 
2 Grether (1992) indicates that the representativeness heuristic is used when available, and it is available a 
high proportion of the time in his earlier (1980) design.  When not available as often in the (1992) 
experimental design, overweighting of the evidence is not borne out as a more general result.   4
  
2.  Background 
An examination of Bayesian updating under sleep deprivation contributes 
significantly to both the literatures in economics and sleep.  A limited amount of sleep 
research indirectly points towards failed information assimilation under sleep deprivation 
(e.g., increased hesitance and reduced focus among sleep-deprived junior doctors in 
Goldman et al, 1972).  However, direct evidence on decision making under uncertainty 
and information updating is needed, and Harrison and Horne (2000) recognize the lack of 
sleep deprivation research on specific decision models.  Bayes rule is a fundamental 
decision model of belief revision and decision-making under uncertainty, and it has 
application to a variety of contexts.  The relevance of this research to economists stems 
from our desire to understand decision-making behavior, and the evidence indicates that a 
good portion of decision-makers are, in their typical state, sleep-deprived to some degree.  
So, any identified differences in behavioral responses relevant to economic decision-
making models highlight the significance of an individual’s sleep-deprived state in 
behavioral analysis.  Such differences also identify a previously uncontrolled confound in 
experimental data sets (for example, student subject experiments during exam periods 
may include relatively more sleep-deprived subjects).   
Only a small amount of economics research has examined sleep.  Biddle and 
Hammermesh (1990) incorporate labor productivity effects of sleep in a theoretical 
model of the allocation of time.  Their empirical results from a variety of sources lead 
them to conclude that increased labor market time reduces sleep, as opposed to leisure 
activities.  Their estimates from a system of demand equations indicate that higher wages   5
reduce sleep—more so for men than women.  This is consistent with the aggregate 
evidence on sleep reduction in many industrialized countries, and it implies that sleep 
deprivation will be an inevitable byproduct of wage growth in a society.  Kamstra et al. 
(2000) examine the effects of daylight saving time changes on financial market returns.  
Interestingly, stock market returns drop both after losing an hour (Spring) and gaining an 
hour (Fall) of sleep.  Reduced performance after gaining an hour of sleep can be 
attributed to what sleep researchers call ‘desynchrony’, or being out-of-sync with one’s 
internal (biological) circadian rhythm.  As a whole, sleep is largely unexplored by 
economists, and we believe that this research is a significant first step towards examining 
potentially important decision-making effects caused by reduced sleep. 
Sleep deprivation can be either partial or total, where total sleep-deprivation 
implies no sleep at all during a given day(s) (i.e., one or more 24 hour periods).  Intuition 
might suggest that total sleep deprivation impairs functioning more than partial sleep 
deprivation.  If this were true then one might not feel as concerned about the average 
partially sleep deprived adult—a college student studying all night for an exam would be 
the exception.  However, existing research indicates that there are just as many reasons to 
be concerned about the effects of partial sleep deprivation. Van Dongen et al. (2003) 
found that chronic partial sleep deprivation of 4 or 6 hours per night for as few as six 
consecutive nights resulted in significant deficits on cognitive performance.  In fact, the 
deficits were equivalent to those from up to two nights of total sleep deprivation 
experienced by a separate treatment group.  In other words, chronic partial sleep 
deprivation can cause performance deficits equivalent to those from 1-2 nights of zero 
sleep.  And yet, partially sleep deprived subjects did not (subjectively) report feeling as   6
sleepy as TSD subjects.  Pilcher and Huffcutt (1996) also find that the average partial 
sleep deprivation study included in their meta-analysis reported evidence of significant 
performance and mood effects, and they note that these partial sleep deprivation effects 
have perhaps been underestimated in some narrative reviews of the sleep literature.
3 
Even when sleep deprivation might not affect some behavioral outcome measures, 
there is still much to understand about how underlying decision processes might be 
altered.  Drummond et al. (2000) is an intriguing study that shows how versatile the brain 
can be under adversity.  In their study, recognition memory on a verbal learning task 
showed no significant change as a result of a TSD treatment, though there was evidence 
that additional brain regions became activated following sleep deprivation.  The subjects’ 
parietal lobes, especially in the left hemisphere, came ‘on-line’ after total sleep 
deprivation.  Because the parietal lobes are related to performance, their activation after 
TSD compensated for any decreased performance resulting from deficits in other brain 
regions.  Others have reported similar increases in brain activation and resultant intact 
performance during TSD on a variety of tasks (Drummond et al., 2001, 2004, 2005; 
Portas et al, 1998; Chee and Choo, 2004). These results indicate that our understanding of 
decision-making under sleep deprivation is incomplete at best, and more exploration is 
needed even in cases where individuals apparently retain functional ability (i.e., cognitive 
function, information processing, etc).  For the present paper we only examine behavioral 
outcomes (not neural outcomes).  The evidence we find in support of distinct decision-
                                                 
3 In this paper, we focus on the effects of TSD on information processing, which are relatively understudied 
compared to cognitive tasks of various sorts.  There is another family of effects of sleep deprivation, which 
includes decreased glucose metabolism, increased risk of obesity, and decreased release of growth 
hormone, among others.    7
weights across sleep-states may, however, be a clue indicating neural activation 
differences in such information-updating environments. 
 
3)  The Experiments 
  As noted, the experiments replicate the Grether (1980) design for a hand-run 
Bayes rule decision task, which we administer to one or two subjects at a time.  Two 
bingo cages are each filled with six colored balls:  Cage A is filled with four green and 
two red balls, and Cage B is filled with three red and three green balls.   Six draws, with 
replacement, are to be made from one of the cages.  Each subject was informed of a 
‘prior’ probability of using Cage A in terms of a die roll.  For example, a 1/3 prior odds 
of Cage A was implemented by informing the subject that Cage A would be used if the 
die roll was 1-2 (3-6 implied use of Cage B).  Subjects did not see the actual die roll, but 
its result tells the experimenter from which Cage to make the six draws from behind an 
opaque divider.  The subject was shown each draw from the bingo cage, and after six 
draws was asked to indicate whether the balls were drawn from Cage A or B.  A correct 
cage response resulted in payment of $12, whereas an incorrect response paid $2.   
The procedure—choose the cage, draw a sample of six balls, subject indicates 
cage used—was repeated six times, and subjects were informed that only one of these 
times would count for payment as determined by a random draw at the end of the 
experiment.  The design was balanced across prior A odds of 1/3, 1/2, and 2/3.
4  This 
creates a reasonably high proportion of samples, on average, that yield three or four green 
balls out of six, which are samples ‘representative’ of Cage B or A, respectively.  This 
allows for an examination of subjects’ propensity to utilize a ‘representativeness’ 
                                                 
4 One implementation accidentally utilized one instance each of the prior odds of 1/6 and 5/6.   8
heuristic, or rule-of-thumb, decision process in making their cage decision.  Note that 
because compensation is higher when correctly indicating the cage, it is incentive 
compatible to indicate Cage A only if subjects perceive the (posterior) probability of 
Cage A to be greater than 50%.   
  If subjects use Bayes rule in their cage choice, they will form a posterior 
probability that Cage A is used from the particular sample of green/red balls drawn--
() ( )
() () B   Cage   |   balls green    # P A   Cage   |   balls green    # P
A   Cage   |   balls green    # P









where Pi is the prior odds of the cage i being used.  That is, the new sample information is 
used to update the prior probability of Cage A.  Table 1 shows the Bayesian updated 
posterior odds of Cage A in this Grether (1980) design.  If subjects use a 
representativeness heuristic to make their choice of which cage is used, then a sample 
draw of three or four green balls out of six will induce a choice of Cage B or A, 
respectively, simply because the sample drawn looks like the population of one of the 
cages.  One can see from Table 1 that the use of the representativeness heuristic can lead 
to an incorrect cage choice.  For example, the posterior probabilities indicate that Cage A 
is more likely when PA=2/3 and three green balls are drawn, but this sample looks like 
the Cage B population.  Similarly, when PA=1/3 and four green balls are drawn, Bayesian 
updating would lead one to indicate that Cage B was used—the posterior probability of 
Cage A is less than 1/2.  The design is balanced so that, on average, the proportion of 
representative samples should not bias accuracy in favor of (or against) Bayesian choices. 
  A total of 24 subjects were administered the Bayes rules experiment.  These 
subjects participated in a total sleep deprivation study, which involved 6 consecutive 
nights and days in the Laboratory for Sleep and Chronobiology at the University of   9
California-San Diego.  Subjects were compensated several hundred dollars for the entire 
stay at the lab, but it was made clear to the subjects that these experiments afforded the 
opportunity to earn additional payments that were unrelated to their fixed compensation.  
Lab staff generally indicated that the subjects were more engaged in these Bayes rule 
experiments than in other cognitive task experiments in which they participated during 
their lab stay, and so the extra compensation appeared salient to the subjects.  Subjects 
were tested on various cognitive dimensions during their entire lab stay, with testing 
occurring approximately every two hours.  This basic Bayes rule experiment was 
performed twice by each subject (so, they had the opportunity to earn $12 twice); once in 
a well-rested state, and once after 22-24 hours of total sleep deprivation.  Each 
administration of the Bayes rule experiment lasted approximately thirty minutes.   
Screening criteria for this study only allowed subjects who were right-handed, 
healthy, and considered ‘normal’ sleepers—those who had a consistent sleep-wake 
schedules that included 7-9 hours in bed each night.  Subjects are indirectly monitored for 
one week prior to reporting to the sleep lab by keeping a sleep journal and wearing an 
actigraph.
5  Because we motivated the relevance of this research by indicating how 
common it is to not be a normal sleeper, one may question the external validity of using 
only normal sleepers.  As experimentalists, however, we face the usual trade-off of 
internal control versus external validity in conducting a sleep deprivation study.  Only by 
using otherwise normal sleepers can we be confident of having removed other confounds 
that may limit our ability to attribute treatment affects to sleep deprivation itself.  During 
                                                 
5 The actigraph measures wrist movement as a proxy of gross motor activity. This movement, in turn, is 
used to determine sleep and wake. These data verify that subjects are engaged in normal sleep patterns 
prior to their lab stay and are not partially sleep deprived at the beginning of the experiment.  The complete 
list of experimental inclusion/exclusion criteria is fairly standard for sleep deprivation research, and they 
are available on request.   10
sleep deprivation, subjects were not allowed any sleep, not allowed stimulants of any 
sort, and they were under constant supervision by lab staff to ensure no sleep during this 
time.  Figure 1 describes the basic timeline of the subjects’ lab stay relative to their 
participation in these decision experiments. 
  In a more recent paper, Grether (1992) notes that there are limits to what can be 
gleaned from the data using his simpler 1980 design.  Because the design favors 
generating samples that are representative of Cage A or B, we are somewhat limited in 
our ability to generalize towards instances in which new information is not necessarily 
representative.  On the other hand, we chose the more simple design in order to present 
subjects the most straightforward decision task that involved prior and new-sample 
information.  As stated above, this design also provides an efficient evaluation of the use 
of a representative heuristic compared to a Bayes rule in subjects’ decision making. The 
dichotomous choice of Cage A or B does not allow us to infer strength of belief (i.e., 55% 
versus 95% certain that the balls came from Cage A), as does Grether (1992) in a 
modified design.  However, given the known debilitating effects of sleep deprivation on 
vigilance, we felt this was a reasonable trade-off in design choice in order to be more 
assured that subjects understood the decision task, even after total sleep deprivation. 
  The particular placement of our Bayes rule task during the subjects’ lab stay 
implies that all subjects complete their second Bayes rule decision task in their sleep 
deprived state.
6  As such, one might be concerned that subject learning may be generating 
some of the data.  To explore this possibility, the Bayes rule experiment was also 
                                                 
6 Due to an un-planned deviation from the sleep lab protocol for these experiments, one subject was 
administered the Bayes rule task under the TSD treatment first, in which case the coding of the TSD 
dummy variable distinguishes this one subject from the others.  Ideally, the ordering of the TSD and well-
rested administration would be counter-balanced but, as described above, the surrounding evidence does 
not indicate that subject learning is generating the TSD treatment effects.   11
administered to an additional eight control subjects (N=96 observations).  These control 
subjects performed the Bayes rule decision task twice, at the same 22-24 hour interval, 
but the control subjects were well-rested in both instances.  Decision model estimates for 
these control subjects (see Appendix) find no significant difference in the weight placed 
on the evidence during the second Bayes rule experiment—contrary to the main finding 
in the TSD data.  
In other words, we find no evidence that the differences in decision-making we 
report in the next section are due to subject learning across the two administrations of the 
experiment.  In addition, subject learning would imply that choice accuracy should be 
higher the second Bayes rule experiment, but it is not.  Or, learning might imply that a 
particular empirical model should better fit the data as choices converge to a particular set 
of model parameters—Grether (1980) finds this among experienced subjects, for 
example.  Our results also show that this is not the case.  We are therefore confident in 
attributing the second trial effects to the sleep deprivation treatment. 
 
4) Results 
  The data are from 24 subjects who ranged from 18 and 39 years of age, and each 
submitted voluntary consent for the total sleep deprivation study.  Because each Bayes 
rule experiment involves 6 trials of the cage choice task, the total number of observations 
is N=144 in the well-rested state and N=144 in the sleep deprived state.  The econometric 
estimations reported in this section account for the potential non-independence of 
decisions of a given subject across different trials as a subject-specific random effect.   12
Table 1 shows the posterior probabilities of Cage A, which imply posterior odds 
of either Cage A or B being more likely.  For example, the posterior probability of Cage 
A of .584 indicates a posterior odds of Cage A of approximately 1.40:1.  Certain prior 
odds and sample draws imply a relatively easier choice for the subject in the sense that 
the posterior odds of the more likely cage are quite high (e.g., if PA=1/3 and only one 
green ball is drawn, the posterior odds of the more likely cage (Cage B in this case) are 
about 11:1.  The bold cells in Table 1 highlight the sample possibilities for Cage A that 
lead to the most difficult choices among all possibilities.  These highlighted cells 
represent all instances when posterior odds of the more likely choice are about 1.40:1 
(some in favor of Cage A, some in favor of Cage B).  Grether (1980) initially restricts 
attention to this subsample of data in order to compare choices of equal difficulty that 
include cases where the representativeness heuristic favors the right choice, cases where 
it favors the wrong choice, and cases where it provides no direction on cage choice. 
Table 2 shows the summary data for this subsample of cases of relatively difficult 
subject choices.  Interestingly, a breakdown of the TSD versus well-rested data indicates 
that, after TSD, subjects get a significantly higher proportion of responses correct when 
the representativeness heuristic favors the Bayesian updated cage choice (p=.10).  When 
well-rested, a higher proportion of difficult choices are correct when representativeness is 
not available or at odds with the Bayesian updated choice, although these differences are 
not significant.
7  This subset of the data also shows evidence consistent with some of the 
sleep deprivation literature, which has found that performance (i.e., accuracy) does not 
                                                 
7 We use a binomial test of the null hypothesis that the proportion of correct choices in TSD subsample is 
equal to the proportion of correct choices in the WR subsample.  We avoid testing this hypothesis in case 
C, when the representativeness heuristic is unavailable, due to extremely low number of cases (N=2) in the 
WR data.   13
necessarily decline under TSD when the task is interesting and/or financially motivated 
(see Harrison and Horne, 2000).  However, a simple look at the percentage of correct 
choices in Table 2 examines only a subsample of less than half of the total data.  
Furthermore, a model of the posterior probability estimates is necessary in order to 
identify any general difference in the decision model used by the subjects.  Such a 
difference is implied if subjects apply compensatory effort following TSD.   
A more complete analysis of subject choice is shown in Table 3.  Here, following 
Grether (1980) for comparison, we estimate the following decision model: 


















it Y  is the subject i’s subjective log odds in favor of Cage A in trial t, LR(A)t is the 












is the prior odds ratio for Cage A.  The 
dichotomous variable Yit is observed equal to 1 if 
*
it Y ≥0, and so we estimate (1) using a 
random effects probit estimation.  Grether (1980) estimates logit results for this model, 
and does not account for subject-specific random effects, and so our econometric 
specifications are similar but not identical.  A Bayes rule hypothesis amounts to testing 
jointly whether α=0, β1=β2>0, while the representativeness heuristic would be supported 
if β1>β2≥0.  In other words, a Bayesian subject will weight the evidence and the prior 
odds equally, while a subject who uses the representativeness heuristic would place more 
weight on the evidence than the prior odds of cage A.  The basic findings of Grether 
(1980), who estimates a version of (1) as a logit model, support the representativeness   14
heuristic hypothesis.  That is, β1>β2≥0 for most of his subject groups, indicating that 
subjects overweight the evidence (i.e., the likelihood ratio) relative to the prior odds.   
  Table 3 shows our random effects probit estimation of model (1) for our subjects.
8  
A test for structural change is performed on the data to test whether or not the same 
model parameters (α, β1, and β2) apply to the well-rested and TSD data.  Using the 
likelihood ratio test on the restricted model of pooled data and the unrestricted models of 
the separate TSD=1 and TSD=0 subsamples, we reject the null hypothesis that a single 
set of model parameters applies to both sets of data (the chi-squared statistic=13.36—
significant at the p=.01 level for the test of three restrictions).  Thus, the results indicate a 
structural change in the parameter estimates following TSD, and so we next turn our 
focus to the model estimates for the separate well-rested and sleep-deprived subsamples.  
As noted earlier, results from additional control subjects do not support the hypothesis 
that the differences in the well-rested and TSD data are due to subject learning.  The 
supporting evidence from these control subjects is given in detail in the Appendix. 
  One difference that stands out in Table 3 is that well-rested subjects place more 
weight on the evidence than the prior odds.  This difference is statistically significant 
using the chi-squared test for the restriction that β1 = β2 (p=.06).  When subjects are well-
rested, the estimated decision model replicates a key result from Grether (1980) using the 
same basic experimental design.  When sleep-deprived, however, there is no significant 
                                                 
8 For comparison, we perform a logit estimation of the Grether (1980) model that is similar to (1) above, 
but does not include a random effects error-term specification.  The pooled results that Grether reports for 
his financially motivated subjects yield the estimated model  
Yit= -.11+2.25*lnLR(A)it+1.82*PA/(1-PA)it, where α, β1, and β2 are statistically significant.  In estimating the 
same logit model for our pooled data, the results are Yit= .04+2.26*lnLR(A)it+1.95*PA/(1-PA)it, with β1 and 
β2 being statistically significant (p=.00).  So, our results are quite comparable to those reported in Grether 
(1980), and logit estimations of any of the models in this section are consistent with the results we find in 
the probit estimations that we report (logit estimation results available from the authors on request).   15
difference in the weight the subjects place on the prior odds versus the sample evidence 
(p=.91).  Sleep deprivation reduces the weight the decision-maker places on the evidence 
relative to the prior odds.  Ironically, the decision model under sleep deprivation is 
consistent with the Bayes rule hypothesis, because sleep deprivation apparently 
eliminates the overweighting that well-rested subjects tend to place on the evidence.  In 
all cases, the models do a reasonably good job of predicting the Cage A and Cage B 
choices of the subjects, correctly predicting their choice between 83% and 85% of the 
time.
9 
  The marginal effects are shown in Table 3 in addition to the coefficient estimates 












ln .  
With our particular experimental parameterization, this term increases by about one when 
comparing PA=1/3 to PA=2/3.  So, the marginal effects of .54 and .34 for the well-rested 
and TSD data, respectively, imply that this increase in prior odds makes subjects 54% 
more likely to choose Cage A when well-rested, but only 34% more likely to choose 
Cage A when sleep-deprived.  This difference between marginal effects on the log odds 
terms may not be statistically significant, however.  Consider an alternative formulation 
for the pooled data set with a dummy variable for TSD=1, along with interaction terms 
                                                 
9 An alternative model that Grether (1980) estimates includes dummy terms for samples that are 
representative of either Cage A or B.  Our key results appear to hold under this alternative empirical model, 
although the model failed to converge properly for the well-rested subsample of data.  Nevertheless, 
relative to the pooled data, the TSD sample estimates for weight placed on the prior odds and the evidence 
are both less that those estimated for the pooled data, and significant in both cases.  Some evidence for use 
of the representativeness heuristic is found more specifically in this alternative estimation, though it is only 
significant for the case when the sample looks like Cage B—subject are then significantly less likely to 












































ln ) * ) ( (ln *
1





We estimate this random effects probit specification to allow a more direct parameter 
estimate comparisons.  The results are: 
 
Parameter  α  β1  β2  β3  β4  β5 
Marginal effect  .07  .91 .58 -.09  -.56  -.24 
p-value (two-tailed test)  .64 .00***  .00*** .61 .00*** .23 
 
These estimates are consistent with Table 3 results in showing that the tendency to 
significantly overweight the evidence (β1 >β2) is mitigated when the subject is sleep 
deprived (β4 < 0).  The coefficient on β5 < 0 is in the direction indicating that sleep 
deprivation significantly reduces the weight one places on the prior odds, but the estimate 
is not statistically significant.
10 
The marginal effect on the evidence, lnLR(A), term in Table 3 represents the 
marginal change to the probability of choosing cage A for a one-unit change in the log-
likelihood ratio for Cage A.  For our design, a sample of two green and four red balls, for 
example, generates a likelihood ratio of -1.05, while a sample of three green and three red 
balls generates lnLR(A)= -.353, which is an increase in lnLR(A) of about .70.  The 
estimated marginal effect for well-rested subjects implies that this change in lnLR(A) 
                                                 
10 For a similarly estimated logit model, β5 significance is at p=.12.  We also examine the relative difficulty 
of the different choices subjects would make, as proxied by the Bayesian posterior-odds of the more likely 
choice—higher odds represent an easier choice.  As expected, we find that more difficult choices reduce 
the likelihood that subjects pick the correct cage.  However, the TSD treatment does not significantly affect 
subject choice-accuracy, neither in general—noted earlier—nor for varying difficulty levels of choice, 
relative to when subjects are well-rested.  These results are available from the authors on request.   17
from drawing one additional green ball would make subjects 57% more likely to choose 
Cage A.  For sleep-deprived subjects the comparative marginal effect is only about 25%, 
and so the magnitude of the estimated effect is also meaningful.  Of course, this does not 
take into account the fact that ’representative’ samples may affect decisions independent 
of their effect on the likelihood ratio, but it is clear that these effects are behaviorally, as 
well as statistically, significant.  The different sample draws in our experiment created a 
range of likelihood ratios from lnLRA(A)= -2.50 for the case where six red balls were 
drawn, to lnLRA(A)= 1.73 for the case where six green balls were drawn, though the 
extreme draws were rare. 
  These differences in the parameter estimates for the decision models when 
comparing subjects well-rested versus sleep-deprived are significant given that they 
indicate that TSD causes subjects to place a decreased decision-weight on new evidence 
and on prior odds.  The estimated effect is significant in the case of the likelihood ratio 
(i.e., the evidence), and the effect is robust to model specification (compare sub-sample 
estimates in Table 3 with estimates of model (2)).  We also estimate that TSD reduces the 
decision-weight that subjects place on the prior odds, though the effect is not as large in 
magnitude and did not reach statistical significance.   
It is intriguing, however, that the accuracy of the subjects’ choices is no worse 
when sleep-deprived than when well-rested, on average.  For all N=144 observations of 
both well-rested and TSD data, subjects indicated the correct cage 67-68% of the time.  
To the extent that well-rested subjects have a tendency to overweight the evidence in the 
Bayes rule experiment, which would contribute to incorrect choices, sleep deprivation   18
mitigates this tendency.
11  Sleep deprivation may also reduce the decision-weight placed 
on the prior odds, resulting in a net effect of unchanged choice accuracy.  For the control 
subjects, choice accuracy drops for the second administration of the task, and so 
maintained choice accuracy following TSD may indicate compensatory effort of some 
sort.  Research on sleep deprivation has found that performance deficits may not occur 
when the task is interesting or complex, or financially motivated (Harrison and Horne, 
2000), although the underlying cognitive processes may be quite different (Drummond et 
al., 2000).  
An examination of the residuals from estimating (1) indicate that the TSD sample 
yields somewhat higher-variance residuals, though the difference is not statistically 
significant (two-sample F-test for variance, p=.20).  This may suggest that choices 
following TSD are not as convergent upon the decision model in (1) as when well-rested.  
Though our residuals-variance result is statistically insignificant, it is similar to Grether’s 
(1980) finding of less consistent behavior for inexperienced subjects.  Our lack of 
significance may be due to our limited sample size, but the result is consistent with 
results in the sleep literature that indicate increased variability and statistical variance 
under TSD. 
It is also worth noting that our result of unaffected choice accuracy in the Bayes 
rule experiment following sleep deprivation only implies that subjects are equally 
accurate in assessing the likelihood of being in state A versus state B.  This does not 
imply that a TSD subject is as adept at dealing with any further ramifications of being in 
                                                 
11 Choices and accuracy are not consistent with random decisions.  In the well-rested subsample, the actual 
Cage A frequency is 54.2%, and subjects chose Cage A 52.8% of the time (actual accuracy was 68.1%).  In 
the TSD subsample, Cage A frequency was 43.8%, and Cage A choice occurred 46.5% of the time (67.4% 
accuracy).     19
one state versus the other.  This latter consideration will also be a function of TSD effects 
on factors like vigilance and reaction time, e.g., that have well-established cognitive 
function effects on individuals.  Furthermore, because the Bayes rule experiment does not 
allow subjects to sort themselves out of the uncertain choice environment, it is important 
to complement these research findings with an examination of preferences for risk.  Such 
an examination is the topic of some of our related research. 
5.  Conclusions 
  The topic of sleep deprivation is virtually unexplored in research on economic 
decision models.  Because of the evidence indicating that, as a society, we are more sleep 
deprived at present than in any previous generation, the implications this has on decision-
making under uncertainty across many environments are worth exploring.  Not only are 
the monetary costs of sleep-deprivation significant to an economy (e.g., lost worker 
productivity), but the implications of sleep-deprivation take on increased significance 
when one considers the public health/safety ramification of sleep-deprivation in certain 
susceptible professions (e.g., medical residency, long-haul truck driving, the military).  
Because recent sleep research indicates that performance of selected tasks may be just as 
affected under chronic partial sleep deprivation as under total sleep deprivation (Van 
Dongen et al., 2003), the effects of sleep deprivation on decision-making are not likely to 
be limited to only the short-term totally sleep deprived individual.    
  This paper examines the effects of sleep deprivation on a particular type of 
decision-making that is of interest to decision scientists, in general, and is unexplored by 
sleep researchers.  We administer a Bayes rule decision experiment to twenty-four 
subjects in experimentally controlled well-rested and sleep-deprived states.  Because the   20
general population does not exactly fit either of these experimentally induced states, the 
results can be viewed as indicative of the decision processes of a given individual when 
approaching either the well-rested or TSD state.  This decision experiment provides a 
fundamental look at how subjects process and filter information in uncertain choice 
environments.  That is, a Bayesian subject is assumed to update a prior belief with new 
information on a situation in order to form a posterior belief of event occurrence.  So, the 
experiment examines a basic decision model that may serve as a building block for many 
more complicated decision environments.   
  Our main result is that, following sleep deprivation, subjects decrease the 
decision-weights placed on new information and prior odds (i.e., prior information).  This 
result is significant and robust to model specification for the estimated effect of TSD on 
the weight subjects place on new sample evidence.  The result that subjects reduce the 
decision-weight placed on the prior odds following TSD is less conclusive.  Nonetheless, 
the net effect is that sleep-deprived subjects behave more in accordance with Bayes rule, 
whereas well-rested subjects behave more non-Bayesian by overweighting the evidence 
relative to prior odds—Grether (1980) finds this overweighting of the evidence among a 
typical sample of student subjects in his design that we replicate.  Using a simple 
outcome measure, we find that the choice accuracy following TSD is not significantly 
different than when well-rested, though there is some indication that decisions may be 
somewhat less consistent (i.e., a higher error term variance in the TSD sample estimates, 
though statistically insignificant at p=.20).   
This experiment involves an unavoidable risky decision environment.  The 
authors’ related research shows evidence that sleep-deprived subjects are less risk-averse   21
for gambles over monetary gains (Drummond, et al., 2006).  As such, the present 
experiments do not capture a potential interesting secondary effect of sleep deprivation.  
Namely, a TSD individual may be less likely to avoid a risky decision environment, when 
the opportunity to sort oneself out of the decision exists.  Sleep deprivation may therefore 
lead individuals to choose more risky decision environments, on average, where the cost 
of error is significantly higher.  This may have interesting implications for, among others, 
military personnel choosing to engage or not engage in a riskier outcome scenario, or a 
physician choosing between two courses of surgical action.   
Finally, because we find that subject choices are, on average, no less accurate in 
the Bayes rule experiment under TSD, the significant difference in the estimated 
parameters of the decision model merit further exploration.  These results may indicate an 
important difference in how the brain processes information in different states, or they 
may indicate compensatory neural activation that is not captured by the parameters of our 
econometric model.
12  Drummond et al. (2000), for example, uses neuroimaging to 
document compensatory brain activity following TSD for subjects engaged in a verbal 
learning task, and other research further supports the compensatory activation hypothesis 
(e.g., Drummond et al., 2001, 2004, 2005; Portas et al, 1998; Chee and Choo, 2004).  So, 
although behavioral outcomes, such as choice accuracy, may be unaffected following 
TSD, neural activation differences may provide important clues as to how the brain 
functions under adverse conditions.  Our finding of significant differences in the 
parameter estimates of a simple decision model applied to subjects both well-rested and 
                                                 
12 The hypothesis of compensatory activation following TSD is further supported by our finding that choice 
accuracy in our well-rested control subjects is actually lower during the second administration of the 
experiment, though subjects are still well-rested.   22
following TSD may be an initial indication of compensatory neural activity that we 
intend to explore further. 
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Table 1:  Posterior probabilities of Cage A 
                                                  Number of Green Balls Drawn 
















2/3  .149 .260 .413 .584 .737 .849 .918 
1/2  .081 .149 .260 .413 .584 .737 .849 
1/3  .042 .081 .149 .260 .413 .584 .737 
Table replicated from Grether (1980) Table 1.  Bold cells represent approximately equal 








Table 2   
Proportion correct by sample type when posterior odds are approximately 1.40:1 
(subsample of data:  Nwell-rested=60, NTSD=62) 








  .52 (N=27)  .58 (N=31)  1.00 (N=2)  .67 (N=24)  .52 (N=25)  .46 (N=13) 




a.  Representativeness heuristic favors Bayesian updated cage choice 
b.  Representativeness heuristic does not favor the Bayesian updated cage choice 
c.  Representativeness heuristic not available. 
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    Table 3:  Probit estimates of 
*
it Y  model 
(random effects specification.  p-values given in parenthesis) 
 






































































































(TSD of 22-24 
hours) 
FIGURE 1 
A week in the sleep lab:  time-line 
Note:  Some subjects stayed in the lab one less day and participated in a one-
night of TSD study.  Our examination of TSD effects after one night of TSD 
allows us to combined subjects from different sleep studies, whether or not they 
participated in a one or two night TSD lab stay. 
Fri 
No 
Sleep   26
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Appendix:  Control Subject Data 
 
The experimental protocol was administered to an additional eight subjects, who 
were well-rested for both the first and second administration of the Bayes rule 
experiment—well-rested was verified using similar measures as for the sleep deprivation 
subjects.  The results of estimation equation (1) from the text for the sample of N=96 
Bayes rule decisions are shown in Table A1 below. 
 
Table A1:  Probit estimates of 
*
it Y  model for 
CONTROL SUBJECTS 
(random effects specification.  p-values 
given in parenthesis) 
  
Pooled (N=96) 
Variable Coeff.  marg.  effect 
Constant  .10 (.61)  .03 (.61) 























As can be seen, results are similar to those from the main data set, except that the 
estimated weights on evidence and prior odds are somewhat higher.  Estimation up to an 
unknown scale parameter, however, prohibits a direct comparison across models.  A test 
for structural change in the data across the first- and second-administration would require 
estimation of two small subsamples of just N=48 observations.  Rather, we estimate a 
model similar to (2) in the text.  That is, the pooled control-subject data is analyzed with 
dummy variables for second-administration of the experiment, with interaction terms that 
allow for the second-administration effects to potentially differ with respect to decision 
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The results are 
  
Parameter  α  β1  β2  β3  β4  β5 
Marginal effect  -.001  .46 .64 -.64 .64  -.25 
p-value (two-tailed test)  .99 .00***  .00*** .23  .17  .48 
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So, the only significant variables are the prior odds and the evidence (we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that β1=β2, p=.24).  The second administration of the Bayes rule task does 
not significantly affect the likelihood of choosing Cage A.  If anything, one could say that 
β4 approaches the opposite significance compared to the TSD subjects.  Though 
statistically insignificant, β4>0 would indicate that control subjects place more weight on 
the evidence in the second trial administration, which would only strengthen our TSD 
findings.   
  Alternatively, one could examine the entire pooled data set, regular and control 
subjects, and include distinct dummy and interactions terms for the Control subjects and 
second administration (2ndAdmin) effects in order to examine if their 
*
it Y decision model 
differs from that of the regular subjects.  For the pooled N=384 observations, we estimate 
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The results are 
  
Parameter  α  β1  β2  β3  β4  β5  β6 β 7 β 8 β 9 
Marginal 
effect 
.05  .69 .62  -.07 -.33  -.27 -.05 -.59 .60  .42 
p-value (two-
tailed test) 
.61 .00***  .00*** .51 .01*** .17 .81 .59 .59 .54 
 
  These results indicate that there are no significant differences in the control 
subjects, except that their decision weights for 
*
it Y  are no different when performing the 
Bayes task the first or the second time (compare with results from estimating (2) in the 
text).  Additionally, the control subjects were correct in their cage choice 75% of the time 
during the first administration of the experiment, but only 56% of the time in the second 
administration.  In sum, the evidence is in support of our conclusions that the sleep 
deprivation treatment, not learning, is generating the behavioral differences we estimate 
in the main text.  It is also supportive of a hypothesis that there is compensatory effort 
engaged following sleep deprivation that helps maintain choice accuracy. 
 
 